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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. J. N. P. COMPANY, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, Supreme Court 
No. 17183 
STATE OF UTAH by and 
through the Division of 
Wildlife Resources, 
Defendant-
Responden t. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by the plaintiff to test the 
constitutionality of a section of the Aquatic Wildlife Act of 
Utah, 23-15-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended by the 
session laws of 1971. The defendant counterclaimed and sought 
to have the court determine whether or not all waters within 
the State of Utah are subject to an easement for recreational 
purposes. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court rules that §23-15-10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as amended by the session laws of 1971 was 
constitutional and that further a certain road was a public 
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road. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the jdugment and the 
entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the 
defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff is a Utah limited partnership which owns 
a large tract of real property utilized for a cattle ranchi~ 
operation in Duchesne County, Utah in an area commonly known 
as Lake Canyon. (R-299) 
Situated in Lake Canyon is a natural lake known as 
Lake Canyon Lake. 
Lake Canyon Lake is approximately 700 yards long 
and approximately 180 yards wide and is at an elevation of 
6,698 feet above sea level and approximately 20 feet deep 
at its greatest depth. (R-51) The lake is fed by natural 
springs in the bed of the lake and by a small stream which 
has its head waters approximately six miles above the lake 
on a quarter section of land owned by the State of Utah. The 
stream after flowing out of the state lands enters the 
plaintiff's property and flows into the lake. The lake has 
an intermittent stream which flows out of the lake during 
high water in the spring of the year and flows for approxi-
mately 200 or 300 yards where it then disappears into the 
ground. The stream which flows into the lake is approximately 
l 
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2 or 3 inches deep and approximately 24 to 36 inches in width 
during its full course from where it originates from springs 
on the state land until it enters Lake Canyon Lake. The water 
flowing from this spring comprises approximately 25% of the 
water flowing into the lake. (R-311) The rest being from 
springs either under or along the lake itself. The stream 
leaving the lake is again of the approximate same size. 
The plaintiff owns all of the land surrounding the 
lake and for several miles below the lake and approximately 
6 or 7 miles upwards from the lake. 
The plaintiff claims that it has appropriated all 
waters within the lake either through diligence claims arising 
prior to 1903, (R-341) through its predecessors in interest or 
through filing with the State Engineer's Office. (Ex. 14) 
A class B county road runs from the Strawberry River 
up Lake Canyon and past the lake and into Indian Reservation 
and U.S. forest lands at the canyon's head. 
Plaintiff contended that the road was a private road 
and that it had, in the past, placed a gate across the road 
and locked the same. (R-320) Upon demand of Duchesne County 
the plaintiff removed the lock that left the gates in tact. 
(R-324) 
The plaintiff's predecessor in interest to the land 
surrounding Lake canyon Lake had entered into a contract with 
the State Division of Wildlife Resources in May of 1973 where-
by the State agreed to stock the lake with fish and the public 
was allowed to fish on the lake for a period of five years 
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during the winter season by means of "ice fishing". (R-42, 
43, 322) The state normally had its fishing season fixed fw 
Lake Canyon Lake during the months of January and February. 
This contract ran for five years and expirea' in May of 1978. 
(R-321) 
After the plaintiff acquired the lands surroundi~ 
Lake Canyon Lake and the expiration of the agreement with t~ 
Utah State Division of Wildlife Resources, the plaintiff 
declined to enter into a new agreement with the state and 
applied for the certificate of registration from the Division 
of Wildlife Resources to create a private fish installation 
on Lake Canyon Lake. (R-329-332) 
The State Division of Wildlife Resources rejected 
the plaintiffs application based upon its regulations that lt 
had drafted pursuant to the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act and pursuant to 23-15-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
amended by the session laws of 1971 wherein it provides, 
inter alia: 
" ... and no such installation shall be developed 
on natural lakes or natural flowing streams, or , 
reservoirs constructed on natural stream channels. 
The plaintiff had posted its property to prohibit 
fishing on Lake Canyon Lake pursuant to 23-20-14, since it 
acquired the lands in question. (R-320) 
The plaintiff then commenced an action to determine 
the constitutionality of 23-15-10, and the state counterclaime: 
claiming that all waters within the State of Utah are subject 
to an easement for recreational purposes. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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At the time of trial there was one other natural 
lake on Lake Canyon Lake located in what is known as the 
Rabbit Gulch Quadrangle (R-301) which lake was in fact a 
private fish hatchery. This lake is commonly known as 
"Lower Lake" and is approximately 3 miles down canyon from 
Lake Canyon Lake. The justification given by the state 
witnesses for allowing Lower Lake to be utilized as a private 
fish hatchery was that it had become one prior to the adopt-
ion of the Aquatic Wildlife Act in 1971. The state's 
witnesses further testified that improvements and enlarge-
ment of the facility had been permitted from time to time. 
(R-421-423) 
Mr. Don Andriana, Chief of the Fishery Section of 
the Division of Wildlife Resources testified that he had 
personally drafted 23-15-10 which was adopted by the State 
Legislature in 1971 and that the purpose and reasoning 
behind the drafting and adoption of 23-15-10 was that public 
water should be used for public enjoyment and that land owner-
ship, per se, should not be the governing factor whether or 
not public waters should be used by the public or access to 
them should not be denied. That due to the perceived increase 
in population of the state it was required that the natural 
waters be perserved for the public. (R-423) 
The witness further testified that the problem of 
trash fish getting into the natural water courses and other 
waters of the state were not considered in the drafting of 
23-15-10. (R-430) The witness further testified that he was 
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well aware that many lakes in the state were totally surrounc; 
by private lands at the time that he drafted 23-15-10. 
The court heard testimony that the lake was suscep-
tible to fishing and that small boats could be launched in it, 
however, there was no provision or launching ramp for doing s: 
The matter having been submitted to the court for 
its determination the court made its memorandum decision on 
June 2, 1980 (R 164-165) wherein the court found that Lake 
Canyon Lake is a natural lake and that it has been used by 
te general public for recreation for a long time and is com-
pletely surrounded by property owned by the plaintiff. The 
court then found that §23-15-10 was not unconstitutional a~ 
that the denial of plaintiffs application was a lawful denial 
by the State Division of Wildlife Resources. The court furthe:: 
went on and held that the road beginning at the mouth of Lake 
Canyon and acceding up the canyon to the national forest 
boundary was private road. 
The court in its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law went further than the actual decree and held that all 
waters in the State of Utah in natural water courses are 
public waters subject to public uses as the waters are reason- ' 
ably susceptible including fishing and other recreational m~ 
provided, however, that such public reights are exercised wi~ 
out impairing existing water rights and without trespassing 
on adjoining private property. (R 180) 
The court went on and held that waters in the State 
of Utah are subject to .a public servitude for fishing and othe:' 
recreational purposes. (R-181) 
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From the court's judgment plaintiff filed its appeal 
on the 8th day of July 1980. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
23-15-10, U.C.A. 1953 AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT TO 
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. 
Section 23-15-10, U.C.A. 1953 as amended by the session 
laws of 1971 provides: 
"23-15-10. Private fish installation. -- It is 
unlawful for any person to develop or operate 
private fish installation without first securing 
a certificateof registration from the Division 
of Wildlife Resources and payment of fees as 
specified by the Wildlife Board. This private 
fish installation must be operated upon the 
rules and regulations specified by the Wildlife 
Board, and no such installation shall be 
developed on natural lakes or natural flowing 
streams, or reservoirs constructed on natural 
stream channels." 
Plaintiff contends that this particular provision of 
the statute is unconstitutional in that the provision that "no 
such installation shall be developed on natural lakes or 
natural flowing streams, or reservoirs constructed on natural 
stream channels.", is violative of the equal protection clauses 
of the Utah and United States Constitution (14th Amendment) in 
that it creates an invidious discrimination between persons 
owning real property and operating a private fish installation 
on streams or lakes not located on natural lakes or natural 
flowing streams and those who would attempt to construct pri-
vate installations on natural lake and natural flowing streams. 
In the case of Cannon vs. Oviatt (1974, Utah) 520 P 
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"Furthermore, the equal protection clause does 
not compel the state to attack every aspect of 
a problem or to refrain from any action at all· 
it is sufficient that the state action be ' 
rationally based and free from invidious dis-
crimination." 
Surprisingly, this section of Utah law was not 
adopted for the protection of aquatic wildlife within the 
state. The sole reason for its adoption was to provide the 
public with places to fish. 
At the same time that the legislature was adopting 
§23-15-10 under the guise that it needed to provide the public 
with places to fish it also passed §23-20-14 which denied t~ 
public the right of access to these same waters that it was 
claiming necessary to perserve for the public in 23-15-10. 
23-20-14, U.C.A. 1953 as amended by the session lm 
of 1971 prohibits anyone from entering onto lands posted ~ 
the property owner as not open for hunting or fishing. Furthe: 
the legislature made it a class B misdemeanor to enter onto 
such posted lands. Subsection (2) of 23-20-14 reads: 
"(2) Property shall be deemed posted properly 
when 'No Trespassing' signs are displayed at approx· 
imately 1/4 mile intervals along the exterior 
boundaries and at all corners and at all fishing 
streams that cross property lines and along all 
roads and trails, and rights-of-way entering such 
land." 
Under subsection (5) of 23-20-14 it is provided: 
"The restriction pertaining to trespassing shall 
be made a part of all hunting and fishing pro-
clamations issued by the Wildlife Board." 
The legislature even went further in 23-10-15 and 
adopted a law which provides: 
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"It is unlawful for any person, without consent 
of the owner or person in charge of any privately 
owned.land, .to tear down, mutilate, or destroy 
any sign, sign board, or other notice which 
regulates trespassing for purposes of hunting, 
trapping or fishing on this land;" 
Mr. Andriana at the time that he drafted 23-14-10 
knew that many lakes in the State of Utah were totally surround-
ed by private property and in spite of this and in spite of the 
fact that trespassing across such private property was specifi-
cally outlawed.under 23-20-14 still, he asserted that the sole 
reason for the adoption of 0 23-15-10 was to provide the public 
with the right to fish the natural lakes of this state. 
It is easily seen that this is a paradox which results 
in the invidious discrimination which makes 23-15-10 unconsti-
tutional. 
The classification of not allowing a private fish 
hatchery on the natural lake but permitting one on a man-made 
lake creates a classification which rests on grounds wholly 
irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objectives, 
which was the allowing of the public the free access and right 
to fish waters in natural lakes. 
The Supreme Court of the United States had an occas-
ion to pass upon this question in the case of Lindsey vs. Norrnet, 
(1972) 405 U.S. 56, 31 L.Ed 2d 36, 92 S.Ct. 862 wherein the 
court stated: 
"The statute potentially applied to all tenan~s, 
rich an poor, commercial and non~cornrnercial; it 
cannot be faulted for overexcessiveness or under-
excessiveness. And classifying tenants of real 
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property differently from other tenants for pur-
poses o~ possessary actions will offend the equal 
protections safeguard 'only if the classification 
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achieve-
ment of the state's objective.' " (Citing cases.) 
The state has the burden of demonstrating that a 
statute which is attacked on the grounds of equal protectioo, 
is necessary to promote a compelling government interest and 
the statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asser: 
ive purposes. Dunn vs Blumstein, (1972) 405 U.S. 330, 31 L.:: 
2d 274, 92 S.Ct. 995. 
In restating thegeneral principles of law laid dow1 
with respect to equal protection cases, the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the case of Eisenstadt vs. Baird, (1972: 
405 U.S. 438 31 L.Ed. 2d 349,92 S.Ct. 1029 stated: 
"The basic principles governing application of the' 
equal protection laws of the Fourteenth Amendment 
are familiar. As the chief justice only recently 
explained in Reed vs. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 78-76, JO 
L.Ed. 2d 225, 229, 92 S.Ct. 251 (1971): 'In apply· 
ing that clause this court has consistently recog-
nized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny 
to states the power to treat different classes of 
persons in different ways.'" (Citing authority) 
"The equal protection clause of that amendment 
does, however, deny to states the power to legislat: 
that different treatment be accorded to persons 
placed by a statute in different classes on the . 
basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the object1n 
of that statute. A classification 'must be reason~ 
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some grounc 
of difference, have a fair and substantial relat1oc 
to the object of the legislation, so that all 
persons similarly circumstances shall be treated 
alike. '" (Ci ting cases.) 
The question that now must be determined by this cc:: 
is whether there is some grounds of difference that rationa~ 
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explains the different treatment accorded those who desire to 
operate a private fish installation to be constructed on a 
natural water course as opposed to hose who wish to construct 
a private fish installation on a man-made or non-natural water 
course. 
As stated before, the legitimate State purpose of 
23-15-10 was to allow the public access to the fishing waters 
of this state. However, this stated purpose is obviated by 
23-20-14 which allows a property owner or property owners who 
own the land around a natural lake to prohibit the public from 
crossing their land to get to the lake for fishing purposes. 
Obviously, the stated purpose fails. The classification adopted 
by the state was not true. Vance v. Bradley (1979) 440 U.S. 93, 
59 L.Ed 2d 171, 99 S.Ct. 939, and therefore such classification 
is a violation of equal protections. 
The state in an affidavit filed with the court on 
July 23, 1979 (R-42) alluded to the fact that fish could migrate 
up the stream onto lands owned by the State and also the fish 
could migrate down stream from the lake. This was totally 
refudiated by not only the testimony of the plaintiff's general 
partner but also by the defendant's witnesses themselves who 
stated that the water was only 2 to 3 inches deep and no fish 
could migrate either up stream (R-355, stipulation) nor down 
stream. The assertion of the State that the fish could in fact 
migrate in the earlier affidavit was an attempt to show that 
the intended purpose for which the section under attack was 
drafted was for the protection of the fishing waters of the 
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state so that trash fish or other undesirable fish could not 
migrate into other bodies of water. However, as protection 
of the waters of the State of Utah was not the reason for the 
adoption of the section of law in question, therefore this 
will not be further addressed. 
Plaintiff contends that the classification of fish 
hatcheries being permitted on private lakes but not on natur0: 
lakes is not based on any reasonable basis and is essential~ 
arbitrary. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Justice vs. 
Standard Gilsonite Company (1961) 12 U 2d 357, 366 P 2d 974 
observed: 
"We recognize as correct the rules stated in 12 
Am Jur 216 and 217 §521 as follows: 
'One who assails the classifications in 
a law must carry the burden of showing 
that it does not rest on any reasonable 
basis, that is essentially arbitrary ... '" 
" ... Before a court can interfere with the 
legislative judgment, it must be able to say 
that there is no fair reason for the law that 
would not require with equal force its exten-
tion to others whom it leaves untouched ... " 
(Citing Utah cases.) 
In the case of Abrahamsen vs. Board of Review, Indus· I 
trial Commission, 3 u. 2d 289, 283 P 2d 213, the Supreme court 
ruled: 
"The standard to be followed in the determina-
tion of this question was set by the case of 
State vs. Mason, 94 u. 501, 78 P.2d 920, 923, 
117 ALR 330: 
'A classification is never unreasonable 
or arbitrary in its inclusion or 
exclusion features so long as there 
is some basis for the differentiation 
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between classes or subject matter 
included as compared to those 
excluded from its operations, provided 
the differentiation bares a reasonable 
relation to the purposes to be accom-
plished by the act ... ' 
"In order to see whether the excluded classes 
or transactions are on a different basis then 
those included, we must look at the purpose of 
the act. The objects and purposes of a law 
present the touchstone for determining proper 
or improper classification ... 
"It is only where some persons or transaction 
excluded from the operation of the law or as 
to the subject matter of the law in no differen-
tiable class from those included in its opera-
tion that the law is discriminatory in the 
sense of being arbitrary and unconstitutional. 
If a reasonable basis to differentiate those 
included from those excluded from its operation 
can be found, it must be held constitutional." 
The legislature gave jurisdiction of the Division of 
Wildlife Resources over both public and private lands and 
waters. 23-14-2, U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
Why is there is distinction drawn between natural and 
non-natural or man-made lakes? What is the rational or reason-
able basis for this distinction? It is submitted that there is 
none. 
As stated in Crowder vs. Salt Lake County (1976, Utah) 
552 P.2d 646: 
"The constitutional safeguard of equal pro-
tection is offended only if the classif ica-
tion rests upon a ground not relative to 
the state's objective." This case then cites 
McGowan vs. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 
1101, 6 L.Ed 2d 393. 
The avowed reason for the state to adopt this part-
icular section was to allow access to the public to natural 
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lakes which it then denied the public that access :Oy §23-20 _1: 
There is no valid reason for this classification and because 
there is none the statute must fall. State vs. Twitchell, 8 
U.2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075, State vs. Cassas, 97 U. 492, 94 P.2d 
414, Baker v. Matheson (1979, Utah) 607 P.2d 233. 
Section 23-15-10 in actuality is affecting real pro· 
perty and not the water which may rest upon that real propert~. 
Section 73-1-1, U.C.A. 1953 as amended states: 
"All waters in this state, whether above or under 
the ground are hereby declared to be the pro-
perty of the public, subject to all existing 
rights to the use thereof." 
Section 23-14-10 states that'no such installation 
shall be developed on natural lakes or natural flowing stre~! 
or reservoirs constructed on natural stream channels," but 
says nothing with respect to the waters. Consequently, what 
the state in actuality is doing is regulating the use of rea; 
property. There is no question but what the stream bed, or 
lake bed belongs to the abutting land owner, unless it can 
be shown that the lake or stream is a navigable body of water. 
Monroe, et. al. vs. State et. al. (1946) 111 U. 1, 175 P.2d 
759. 
states: 
Section 65-1-14 U.C.A. 1953 as amended specifically 
"Nothing herein contained shall be construed as 
a legislative declaration of ownership by the 
land of beds of non-naviqable lakes, bays thereof. 
of of beds of non-navigable rivers or streams." 
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The trial court found as a matter of law that the 
lake bed in question did in fact belong to the plaintiff and 
with this plaintiff does not quarrel. What the plaintiff 
does quarrel with is a distinction asserted by the state for 
land which may have located on it a natural body of water as 
opposed to a man-made body of water. 
It is difficult to rationalize or see what difference 
there may be between water which is situated on a natural lake 
but has been appropriated for use by the filing of applications 
for appropriation and the granting of those applications to 
water which may be situated in a man-made channel or in a man-
made pond or lake but which has not been appropriated by the 
filing of appropriate applications or the granting of the same. 
Appellant does not dispute that the state does have 
the right to manage its wildlife resources, however, in manag-
ing those wildlife resources the state may not indulge in dis-
crimination. Baldwin vs. Montana Fish and Game Commission (1978) 
436 U.S. 371 56 L.Ed 2d 354, 98 s.ct. 1852. 
The state's argument for maintaining the constitution-
ality of 23-15-10 seems to be based upon a mixing of apples and 
oranges, or the use of real property as opposed to use of un-
appropriated public waters, although in the present case, the 
waters of Lake Canyon Lake have in fact been either appropriated 
by the plaintiff through his diligence rights or he has a para-
mount right to the use thereof by reason of his pending applica-
tion for appropriation. 
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The use of water within the State of Utah is contr: 
basically, by the State Engineer and the attempt of the Sta~ 
Division of Wildlife Resources to inject itself into the ~~ 
ment of the water resources of this state is contrary to ln. 
It is respectfully submitted that there being no k 
able or rational basis for the distinction between man-ma~~ 
natural waterways the statute in question, 23-15-10, must be 
held unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection ~· 
visisions of the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
POINT II 
THE STATE WRONGFULLY DENIED PLAINTIFF A PERMIT 
TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN A PRIVATE FISHERY INSTALL-
ATION ON LAKE CANYON LAKE. 
The state denied the plaintiff's applciation for 
authority to construct a private fish installation based upon 
its rules and regulations which it had adopted pursuant to t~ 
provisions of 23-15-10. Copies of those rules and regulations 
are found at Record 6 through 10. As the section of law under 
which these regulations were implemented is unconstitutional, 
the regulations themselves must fail and therefore the plain· 
tiff is entitled to a Writ of Mandate to compel the state to 
issue to him a permit to construct and maintain a private fisf: 
installation on Lake Canyon Lake. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ROAD BEGINNING 
AT THE MOUTH OF LAKE CANYON AND EXTENDING UP THE 
CANYON TO THE NATIONAL FOREST BOUNDARY WAS A 
PUBLIC ROAD. 
The plaintiff in his complaint did not raise the iss: 
of whether or not the road running from the Strawberry River~ 
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Lake Canyon Lake to the forest lands was a public or private 
road. Likewise in the counterclaim of the defendant this 
issue was not raised. (R 14-16) 
Nowhere in any of the pleadings is there any question 
raised with respect to this road and its status, that is whether 
it is a public or private way. 
No motion was made under Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to try this issue nor to conform the pleadings to 
the proof adduced. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court's deter-
mination as to the status of this road is totally without 
the scope of the pleadings and therefore should be reversed. 
National Farmers Union Property vs. Thompson, 4 U 2d 7, 283 
Prd 249. The question of whether the road was a public way 
was an entirely new cause of action and therefore should not 
have been tried. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that 23-15-10 of the 
Aquatic Wildlife Act of Utah, is unconstitutional and there-
fore should be struck down. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred 
in ruling on a matter which was not properly before it, with 
respect to the status of the road running near the lake and 
that therefore the court's judgment should be reversed with 
respect thereto. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-18-
Matters raised in the findings of fact and conclusic:. 
of law with respect to whether or not there is a servitude oi I 
all of the waters of the State of Utah for an easement for ~l 
use for fishing and recreational purposes was not incorporated ' 
into the court's j~dgment and therefore plaintiff-appellant wi:.1· 
not address these issues as they are not germaine to the issue; 
before the court based upon the court's judgment. 
Further, questions with respect to the question~ 
navigability of Lake Canyon Lake are also not addressed, t~ 
court not having entered a judgment and order with respect the:' 
to, even though the court in its findings of fact and conclusi:· 
of law did address these matters. 
Respectfully subm,itted, 
td/ /// /,· '"L--s:h~ ~ 
PAUL N. COTRO-MAi~ES 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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